FIX harden HTTP target request and upload handling - #2405
Merged
Roman Lutz (romanlutz) merged 8 commits intoAug 21, 2026
Merged
Conversation
Co-authored-by: Copilot App <223556219+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Copilot App <223556219+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Copilot App <223556219+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Copilot App <223556219+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Copilot App <223556219+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com> Copilot-Session: a5e26abb-1f6f-4138-8a23-4cfb10e1625f
Co-authored-by: Copilot App <223556219+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com> Copilot-Session: a5e26abb-1f6f-4138-8a23-4cfb10e1625f
hannahwestra25
left a comment
Contributor
There was a problem hiding this comment.
need to update:
PyRIT/doc/code/executor/5_workflow.py
Line 257 in 201bb0a
hannahwestra25
approved these changes
Aug 19, 2026
Co-authored-by: Copilot App <223556219+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com> Copilot-Session: a5e26abb-1f6f-4138-8a23-4cfb10e1625f
Co-authored-by: Copilot App <223556219+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com> Copilot-Session: a5e26abb-1f6f-4138-8a23-4cfb10e1625f
Roman Lutz (romanlutz)
deleted the
romanlutz-harden-http-target-safeguards
branch
August 21, 2026 02:43
This file contains hidden or bidirectional Unicode text that may be interpreted or compiled differently than what appears below. To review, open the file in an editor that reveals hidden Unicode characters.
Learn more about bidirectional Unicode characters
Sign up for free
to join this conversation on GitHub.
Already have an account?
Sign in to comment
Add this suggestion to a batch that can be applied as a single commit.This suggestion is invalid because no changes were made to the code.Suggestions cannot be applied while the pull request is closed.Suggestions cannot be applied while viewing a subset of changes.Only one suggestion per line can be applied in a batch.Add this suggestion to a batch that can be applied as a single commit.Applying suggestions on deleted lines is not supported.You must change the existing code in this line in order to create a valid suggestion.Outdated suggestions cannot be applied.This suggestion has been applied or marked resolved.Suggestions cannot be applied from pending reviews.Suggestions cannot be applied on multi-line comments.Suggestions cannot be applied while the pull request is queued to merge.Suggestion cannot be applied right now. Please check back later.
Description
Finding by Roman Lutz (@romanlutz) and Microsoft Security FORGE Lab.
HTTP target prompt substitution could alter the configured destination, inject new request headers, follow redirects without explicit operator control, or cause
HTTPXAPITargetto upload locally accessible files without containment. This change adds safeguards while preserving existing behavior for current callers.follow_redirectscontrol toHTTPTargetandHTTPXAPITarget, defaulting to the existing enabled behavior for compatibility.allowed_upload_directory.Tests and Documentation
Added focused unit coverage for destination changes, arbitrary operator-configured internal destinations, enabled and disabled redirects, CR/LF injection contexts, multiline request bodies, upload-directory containment, validation ordering, and deprecated compatibility paths. The combined HTTP-target suite passes with 48 tests.
Documentation was not changed because the affected constructor parameters and behavior are documented in their API docstrings. JupyText was not run because no documentation notebooks were modified.