[UR][CUDA][HIP] Fix heap buffer overflow in kernel argument updates#21392
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[UR][CUDA][HIP] Fix heap buffer overflow in kernel argument updates#21392
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Security: Prevent heap buffer overflow when updating kernel arguments with mismatched sizes. The original code used assert() to validate size consistency, which is compiled out in release builds (-DNDEBUG). An attacker could exploit this by setting a small argument initially (passing bounds check) then updating with a larger size (bypassing check), causing heap overflow. Changes: - Replace debug-only assert() with runtime validation - Throw UR_RESULT_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT on size mismatch - Affects urKernelSetArgValue() API in CUDA and HIP adapters
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Security: Prevent heap buffer overflow when updating kernel arguments with mismatched sizes.
The original code used assert() to validate size consistency, which is compiled out in release builds (-DNDEBUG). An attacker could exploit this by setting a small argument initially (passing bounds check) then updating with a larger size (bypassing check), causing heap overflow.
Changes: