fix(validate): reject dangerous Unicode characters in input validation#484
fix(validate): reject dangerous Unicode characters in input validation#484abhiram304 wants to merge 3 commits intogoogleworkspace:mainfrom
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Summary of ChangesHello, I'm Gemini Code Assist1! I'm currently reviewing this pull request and will post my feedback shortly. In the meantime, here's a summary to help you and other reviewers quickly get up to speed! This pull request significantly enhances the security and robustness of input validation by extending checks to cover a broader range of dangerous Unicode characters. It closes potential loopholes where characters like zero-width spaces or bidirectional overrides could bypass existing ASCII-only or limited Unicode control character checks, thereby preventing potential injection attacks or misinterpretations in resource names and other inputs. Highlights
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Code Review
This pull request effectively addresses a security vulnerability by extending input validation to reject dangerous Unicode characters that were previously missed. The approach of using a shared constant for the rejected characters is sound. My review focuses on improving the performance and structure of this new validation logic, which is crucial for security-sensitive code, by suggesting a more efficient implementation using Rust's matches! macro. The accompanying tests are thorough and provide good coverage for the new checks.
Extend reject_control_chars() and validate_resource_name() to reject zero-width chars (U+200B, U+200C, U+200D, U+FEFF), bidi overrides (U+202A-U+202E), Unicode line/paragraph separators (U+2028, U+2029), and directional isolates (U+2066-U+2069). These multi-byte codepoints were silently passing the previous ASCII-range byte check, creating a potential injection vector when the CLI is driven by LLM agents. Adds 20 new tests covering all rejected categories plus documented intentional pass-throughs (homoglyphs, overlong names).
… using matches! Switch from a REJECTED_UNICODE_CHARS &[char] constant + .contains() (O(M) linear scan per character) to an is_rejected_unicode(c: char) -> bool helper that uses the matches! macro with char ranges. This gives O(1) per character and reads more clearly at call sites via .any(is_rejected_unicode).
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Code Review
This pull request enhances input validation by rejecting a range of dangerous Unicode characters, which is a great security improvement. My review identifies a recurring performance issue where the new checks introduce a second iteration over the input string. I've recommended combining these checks into a single pass for improved performance and efficiency.
Address review feedback: replace the two-iteration approach (one byte scan + one char scan) in reject_control_chars with a single char loop, and merge the separate is_control / is_rejected_unicode guards in validate_resource_name into one any() call. Avoids iterating the input string twice, closing the O(N*M) concern raised by the reviewer.
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Code Review
This pull request enhances input validation by rejecting a range of dangerous Unicode characters, such as zero-width spaces, bidirectional overrides, and line/paragraph separators. The changes correctly move from a byte-based check to a character-based one to handle multi-byte Unicode characters properly. The new validation is applied to both directory paths and resource names. The addition of comprehensive tests for the new Unicode checks is also a great improvement. I have one suggestion to improve code clarity in one of the validation functions.
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Summary
reject_control_chars()used a byte-level ASCII check (b < 0x20 || b == 0x7F) that silently passed all multi-byte Unicode — zero-width chars, bidi overrides, and Unicode line/paragraph separators could slip through uncheckedvalidate_resource_name()usedc.is_control()(Unicode "Cc" only), missing "Cf" (format) and "Zl"/"Zp" (separator) categories — the same dangerous charsREJECTED_UNICODE_CHARSconstant covering U+200B–U+200D, U+FEFF, U+202A–U+202E, U+2028–U+2029, and U+2066–U+2069; both validators now check against itTest plan
cargo test validate— all 20 new Unicode tests pass alongside existing suitevalidate_resource_name("foo\u{200B}bar")returnsErrvalidate_resource_name("foo\u{202E}bar")returnsErr(RTL override)validate_resource_name("日本語")still returnsOk(normal Unicode unaffected)validate_safe_output_dir("foo\u{2028}bar")returnsErr🤖 Generated with Claude Code