WARNING: MAJOR (BREAKING) CHANGE: Update dependency urllib3 to v2 [SECURITY] (master) #1741

renovatebot-confluentinc · 2025-07-25T15:32:06Z

For any questions/concerns about this PR, please review the Renovate Bot wiki/FAQs, or the #renovatebot Slack channel.

This PR contains the following updates:

Package	Change	Age	Adoption	Passing	Confidence
urllib3	`==1.26.7` -> `==2.5.0`

GitHub Vulnerability Alerts

CVE-2023-43804

urllib3 doesn't treat the Cookie HTTP header special or provide any helpers for managing cookies over HTTP, that is the responsibility of the user. However, it is possible for a user to specify a Cookie header and unknowingly leak information via HTTP redirects to a different origin if that user doesn't disable redirects explicitly.

Users must handle redirects themselves instead of relying on urllib3's automatic redirects to achieve safe processing of the Cookie header, thus we decided to strip the header by default in order to further protect users who aren't using the correct approach.

Affected usages

We believe the number of usages affected by this advisory is low. It requires all of the following to be true to be exploited:

Using an affected version of urllib3 (patched in v1.26.17 and v2.0.6)
Using the Cookie header on requests, which is mostly typical for impersonating a browser.
Not disabling HTTP redirects
Either not using HTTPS or for the origin server to redirect to a malicious origin.

Remediation

Upgrading to at least urllib3 v1.26.17 or v2.0.6
Disabling HTTP redirects using redirects=False when sending requests.
Not using the Cookie header.

CVE-2023-45803

urllib3 previously wouldn't remove the HTTP request body when an HTTP redirect response using status 303 "See Other" after the request had its method changed from one that could accept a request body (like POST) to GET as is required by HTTP RFCs. Although the behavior of removing the request body is not specified in the section for redirects, it can be inferred by piecing together information from different sections and we have observed the behavior in other major HTTP client implementations like curl and web browsers.

From RFC 9110 Section 9.3.1:

A client SHOULD NOT generate content in a GET request unless it is made directly to an origin server that has previously indicated, in or out of band, that such a request has a purpose and will be adequately supported.

Affected usages

Because the vulnerability requires a previously trusted service to become compromised in order to have an impact on confidentiality we believe the exploitability of this vulnerability is low. Additionally, many users aren't putting sensitive data in HTTP request bodies, if this is the case then this vulnerability isn't exploitable.

Both of the following conditions must be true to be affected by this vulnerability:

If you're using urllib3 and submitting sensitive information in the HTTP request body (such as form data or JSON)
The origin service is compromised and starts redirecting using 303 to a malicious peer or the redirected-to service becomes compromised.

Remediation

You can remediate this vulnerability with any of the following steps:

Upgrade to a patched version of urllib3 (v1.26.18 or v2.0.7)
Disable redirects for services that you aren't expecting to respond with redirects with redirects=False.
Disable automatic redirects with redirects=False and handle 303 redirects manually by stripping the HTTP request body.

CVE-2024-37891

When using urllib3's proxy support with ProxyManager, the Proxy-Authorization header is only sent to the configured proxy, as expected.

However, when sending HTTP requests without using urllib3's proxy support, it's possible to accidentally configure the Proxy-Authorization header even though it won't have any effect as the request is not using a forwarding proxy or a tunneling proxy. In those cases, urllib3 doesn't treat the Proxy-Authorization HTTP header as one carrying authentication material and thus doesn't strip the header on cross-origin redirects.

Because this is a highly unlikely scenario, we believe the severity of this vulnerability is low for almost all users. Out of an abundance of caution urllib3 will automatically strip the Proxy-Authorization header during cross-origin redirects to avoid the small chance that users are doing this on accident.

Users should use urllib3's proxy support or disable automatic redirects to achieve safe processing of the Proxy-Authorization header, but we still decided to strip the header by default in order to further protect users who aren't using the correct approach.

Affected usages

We believe the number of usages affected by this advisory is low. It requires all of the following to be true to be exploited:

Setting the Proxy-Authorization header without using urllib3's built-in proxy support.
Not disabling HTTP redirects.
Either not using an HTTPS origin server or for the proxy or target origin to redirect to a malicious origin.

Remediation

Using the Proxy-Authorization header with urllib3's ProxyManager.
Disabling HTTP redirects using redirects=False when sending requests.
Not using the Proxy-Authorization header.

CVE-2025-50181

urllib3 handles redirects and retries using the same mechanism, which is controlled by the Retry object. The most common way to disable redirects is at the request level, as follows:

resp = urllib3.request("GET", "https://httpbin.org/redirect/1", redirect=False)
print(resp.status)

# 302

However, it is also possible to disable redirects, for all requests, by instantiating a PoolManager and specifying retries in a way that disable redirects:

import urllib3

http = urllib3.PoolManager(retries=0)  # should raise MaxRetryError on redirect
http = urllib3.PoolManager(retries=urllib3.Retry(redirect=0))  # equivalent to the above
http = urllib3.PoolManager(retries=False)  # should return the first response

resp = http.request("GET", "https://httpbin.org/redirect/1")

However, the retries parameter is currently ignored, which means all the above examples don't disable redirects.

Affected usages

Passing retries on PoolManager instantiation to disable redirects or restrict their number.

By default, requests and botocore users are not affected.

Impact

Redirects are often used to exploit SSRF vulnerabilities. An application attempting to mitigate SSRF or open redirect vulnerabilities by disabling redirects at the PoolManager level will remain vulnerable.

Remediation

You can remediate this vulnerability with the following steps:

Upgrade to a patched version of urllib3. If your organization would benefit from the continued support of urllib3 1.x, please contact [email protected] to discuss sponsorship or contribution opportunities.
Disable redirects at the request() level instead of the PoolManager() level.

`Cookie` HTTP header isn't stripped on cross-origin redirects

CVE-2023-43804 / GHSA-v845-jxx5-vc9f / PYSEC-2023-192

More information

Details

urllib3 doesn't treat the Cookie HTTP header special or provide any helpers for managing cookies over HTTP, that is the responsibility of the user. However, it is possible for a user to specify a Cookie header and unknowingly leak information via HTTP redirects to a different origin if that user doesn't disable redirects explicitly.

Users must handle redirects themselves instead of relying on urllib3's automatic redirects to achieve safe processing of the Cookie header, thus we decided to strip the header by default in order to further protect users who aren't using the correct approach.

Affected usages

We believe the number of usages affected by this advisory is low. It requires all of the following to be true to be exploited:

Using an affected version of urllib3 (patched in v1.26.17 and v2.0.6)
Using the Cookie header on requests, which is mostly typical for impersonating a browser.
Not disabling HTTP redirects
Either not using HTTPS or for the origin server to redirect to a malicious origin.

Remediation

Upgrading to at least urllib3 v1.26.17 or v2.0.6
Disabling HTTP redirects using redirects=False when sending requests.
Not using the Cookie header.

Severity

CVSS Score: 5.9 / 10 (Medium)
Vector String: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N

References

This data is provided by OSV and the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).

CVE-2023-43804 / GHSA-v845-jxx5-vc9f / PYSEC-2023-192

More information

Details

urllib3 is a user-friendly HTTP client library for Python. urllib3 doesn't treat the Cookie HTTP header special or provide any helpers for managing cookies over HTTP, that is the responsibility of the user. However, it is possible for a user to specify a Cookie header and unknowingly leak information via HTTP redirects to a different origin if that user doesn't disable redirects explicitly. This issue has been patched in urllib3 version 1.26.17 or 2.0.5.

Severity

CVSS Score: 8.1 / 10 (High)
Vector String: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N

References

This data is provided by OSV and the PyPI Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).

urllib3's request body not stripped after redirect from 303 status changes request method to GET

CVE-2023-45803 / GHSA-g4mx-q9vg-27p4 / PYSEC-2023-212

More information

Details

urllib3 previously wouldn't remove the HTTP request body when an HTTP redirect response using status 303 "See Other" after the request had its method changed from one that could accept a request body (like POST) to GET as is required by HTTP RFCs. Although the behavior of removing the request body is not specified in the section for redirects, it can be inferred by piecing together information from different sections and we have observed the behavior in other major HTTP client implementations like curl and web browsers.

From RFC 9110 Section 9.3.1:

A client SHOULD NOT generate content in a GET request unless it is made directly to an origin server that has previously indicated, in or out of band, that such a request has a purpose and will be adequately supported.

Affected usages

Because the vulnerability requires a previously trusted service to become compromised in order to have an impact on confidentiality we believe the exploitability of this vulnerability is low. Additionally, many users aren't putting sensitive data in HTTP request bodies, if this is the case then this vulnerability isn't exploitable.

Both of the following conditions must be true to be affected by this vulnerability:

If you're using urllib3 and submitting sensitive information in the HTTP request body (such as form data or JSON)
The origin service is compromised and starts redirecting using 303 to a malicious peer or the redirected-to service becomes compromised.

Remediation

You can remediate this vulnerability with any of the following steps:

Upgrade to a patched version of urllib3 (v1.26.18 or v2.0.7)
Disable redirects for services that you aren't expecting to respond with redirects with redirects=False.
Disable automatic redirects with redirects=False and handle 303 redirects manually by stripping the HTTP request body.

Severity

CVSS Score: 4.2 / 10 (Medium)
Vector String: CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:H/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N

References

This data is provided by OSV and the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).

CVE-2023-45803 / GHSA-g4mx-q9vg-27p4 / PYSEC-2023-212

More information

Details

urllib3 is a user-friendly HTTP client library for Python. urllib3 previously wouldn't remove the HTTP request body when an HTTP redirect response using status 301, 302, or 303 after the request had its method changed from one that could accept a request body (like POST) to GET as is required by HTTP RFCs. Although this behavior is not specified in the section for redirects, it can be inferred by piecing together information from different sections and we have observed the behavior in other major HTTP client implementations like curl and web browsers. Because the vulnerability requires a previously trusted service to become compromised in order to have an impact on confidentiality we believe the exploitability of this vulnerability is low. Additionally, many users aren't putting sensitive data in HTTP request bodies, if this is the case then this vulnerability isn't exploitable. Both of the following conditions must be true to be affected by this vulnerability: 1. Using urllib3 and submitting sensitive information in the HTTP request body (such as form data or JSON) and 2. The origin service is compromised and starts redirecting using 301, 302, or 303 to a malicious peer or the redirected-to service becomes compromised. This issue has been addressed in versions 1.26.18 and 2.0.7 and users are advised to update to resolve this issue. Users unable to update should disable redirects for services that aren't expecting to respond with redirects with redirects=False and disable automatic redirects with redirects=False and handle 301, 302, and 303 redirects manually by stripping the HTTP request body.

Severity

CVSS Score: 4.2 / 10 (Medium)
Vector String: CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:H/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N

References

This data is provided by OSV and the PyPI Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).

urllib3's Proxy-Authorization request header isn't stripped during cross-origin redirects

CVE-2024-37891 / GHSA-34jh-p97f-mpxf

More information

Details

When using urllib3's proxy support with ProxyManager, the Proxy-Authorization header is only sent to the configured proxy, as expected.

However, when sending HTTP requests without using urllib3's proxy support, it's possible to accidentally configure the Proxy-Authorization header even though it won't have any effect as the request is not using a forwarding proxy or a tunneling proxy. In those cases, urllib3 doesn't treat the Proxy-Authorization HTTP header as one carrying authentication material and thus doesn't strip the header on cross-origin redirects.

Because this is a highly unlikely scenario, we believe the severity of this vulnerability is low for almost all users. Out of an abundance of caution urllib3 will automatically strip the Proxy-Authorization header during cross-origin redirects to avoid the small chance that users are doing this on accident.

Users should use urllib3's proxy support or disable automatic redirects to achieve safe processing of the Proxy-Authorization header, but we still decided to strip the header by default in order to further protect users who aren't using the correct approach.

Affected usages

We believe the number of usages affected by this advisory is low. It requires all of the following to be true to be exploited:

Setting the Proxy-Authorization header without using urllib3's built-in proxy support.
Not disabling HTTP redirects.
Either not using an HTTPS origin server or for the proxy or target origin to redirect to a malicious origin.

Remediation

Using the Proxy-Authorization header with urllib3's ProxyManager.
Disabling HTTP redirects using redirects=False when sending requests.
Not using the Proxy-Authorization header.

Severity

CVSS Score: 4.4 / 10 (Medium)
Vector String: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N

References

This data is provided by OSV and the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).

urllib3 redirects are not disabled when retries are disabled on PoolManager instantiation

CVE-2025-50181 / GHSA-pq67-6m6q-mj2v

More information

Details

urllib3 handles redirects and retries using the same mechanism, which is controlled by the Retry object. The most common way to disable redirects is at the request level, as follows:

resp = urllib3.request("GET", "https://httpbin.org/redirect/1", redirect=False)
print(resp.status)

##### 302

However, it is also possible to disable redirects, for all requests, by instantiating a PoolManager and specifying retries in a way that disable redirects:

import urllib3

http = urllib3.PoolManager(retries=0)  # should raise MaxRetryError on redirect
http = urllib3.PoolManager(retries=urllib3.Retry(redirect=0))  # equivalent to the above
http = urllib3.PoolManager(retries=False)  # should return the first response

resp = http.request("GET", "https://httpbin.org/redirect/1")

However, the retries parameter is currently ignored, which means all the above examples don't disable redirects.

Affected usages

Passing retries on PoolManager instantiation to disable redirects or restrict their number.

By default, requests and botocore users are not affected.

Impact

Redirects are often used to exploit SSRF vulnerabilities. An application attempting to mitigate SSRF or open redirect vulnerabilities by disabling redirects at the PoolManager level will remain vulnerable.

Remediation

You can remediate this vulnerability with the following steps:

Upgrade to a patched version of urllib3. If your organization would benefit from the continued support of urllib3 1.x, please contact [email protected] to discuss sponsorship or contribution opportunities.
Disable redirects at the request() level instead of the PoolManager() level.

Severity

CVSS Score: 5.3 / 10 (Medium)
Vector String: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N

References

This data is provided by OSV and the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).

Configuration

📅 Schedule: Branch creation - "" (UTC), Automerge - At any time (no schedule defined).

🚦 Automerge: Disabled by config. Please merge this manually once you are satisfied.

♻ Rebasing: Whenever PR becomes conflicted, or you tick the rebase/retry checkbox.

🔕 Ignore: Close this PR and you won't be reminded about this update again.

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This PR has been generated by Renovate Bot.

…CURITY]

service-bot-app · 2025-07-26T02:32:59Z

Could not automerge PR: Version change not allowed. See your service.yml and default values.

WARNING: MAJOR (BREAKING) CHANGE: Update dependency urllib3 to v2 [SE…

2a342ba

…CURITY]

renovatebot-confluentinc bot added the renovatebot-cve label Jul 25, 2025

service-bot-app bot marked this pull request as ready for review July 26, 2025 02:32

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WARNING: MAJOR (BREAKING) CHANGE: Update dependency urllib3 to v2 [SECURITY] (master) #1741

WARNING: MAJOR (BREAKING) CHANGE: Update dependency urllib3 to v2 [SECURITY] (master) #1741

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WARNING: MAJOR (BREAKING) CHANGE: Update dependency urllib3 to v2 [SECURITY] (master) #1741

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WARNING: MAJOR (BREAKING) CHANGE: Update dependency urllib3 to v2 [SECURITY] (master) #1741

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GitHub Vulnerability Alerts

CVE-2023-43804

Affected usages

Remediation

CVE-2023-45803

Affected usages

Remediation

CVE-2024-37891

Affected usages

Remediation

CVE-2025-50181

Affected usages

Impact

Remediation

Cookie HTTP header isn't stripped on cross-origin redirects

Details

Affected usages

Remediation

Severity

References

CVE-2023-43804 / GHSA-v845-jxx5-vc9f / PYSEC-2023-192

Details

Severity

References

urllib3's request body not stripped after redirect from 303 status changes request method to GET

Details

Affected usages

Remediation

Severity

References

CVE-2023-45803 / GHSA-g4mx-q9vg-27p4 / PYSEC-2023-212

Details

Severity

References

urllib3's Proxy-Authorization request header isn't stripped during cross-origin redirects

Details

Affected usages

Remediation

Severity

References

urllib3 redirects are not disabled when retries are disabled on PoolManager instantiation

Details

Affected usages

Impact

Remediation

Severity

References

Configuration

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renovatebot-confluentinc bot commented Jul 25, 2025 •

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`Cookie` HTTP header isn't stripped on cross-origin redirects