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crypto: ecdsa - Avoid signed integer overflow on signature decoding
[ Upstream commit 3b0565c ] When extracting a signature component r or s from an ASN.1-encoded integer, ecdsa_get_signature_rs() subtracts the expected length "bufsize" from the ASN.1 length "vlen" (both of unsigned type size_t) and stores the result in "diff" (of signed type ssize_t). This results in a signed integer overflow if vlen > SSIZE_MAX + bufsize. The kernel is compiled with -fno-strict-overflow, which implies -fwrapv, meaning signed integer overflow is not undefined behavior. And the function does check for overflow: if (-diff >= bufsize) return -EINVAL; So the code is fine in principle but not very obvious. In the future it might trigger a false-positive with CONFIG_UBSAN_SIGNED_WRAP=y. Avoid by comparing the two unsigned variables directly and erroring out if "vlen" is too large. Signed-off-by: Lukas Wunner <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Stefan Berger <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Jonathan Cameron <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
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