HTTP Parsing Vulnerabilities in Check Point Firewall-1 #1717
+34
−4
Add this suggestion to a batch that can be applied as a single commit.
This suggestion is invalid because no changes were made to the code.
Suggestions cannot be applied while the pull request is closed.
Suggestions cannot be applied while viewing a subset of changes.
Only one suggestion per line can be applied in a batch.
Add this suggestion to a batch that can be applied as a single commit.
Applying suggestions on deleted lines is not supported.
You must change the existing code in this line in order to create a valid suggestion.
Outdated suggestions cannot be applied.
This suggestion has been applied or marked resolved.
Suggestions cannot be applied from pending reviews.
Suggestions cannot be applied on multi-line comments.
Suggestions cannot be applied while the pull request is queued to merge.
Suggestion cannot be applied right now. Please check back later.
🤖 Automated Content Update
This PR was automatically generated by the HackTricks News Bot based on a technical blog post.
📝 Source Information
🎯 Content Summary
Scope and affected systems
The alert documents a remotely exploitable HTTP parsing vulnerability in multiple versions of Check Point Firewall-1 that support HTTP-aware inspection components:
- Check Point Firewall-1 NG FCS
- Check Point Firewall-1 NG FP1
- Check Point Firewall-1 NG FP2
- Check Point Firewall-1 NG FP3, HF2
- Check Point Firewall-1 NG with Application Intelligence R54
- Check Point Firewall-1 NG with Application Intelligence R5...
🔧 Technical Details
Exploiting HTTP error-handling format string bugs in application proxies
When an HTTP-aware proxy or firewall constructs error messages using
sprintf(), any user-controlled part of an invalid HTTP request that is embedded directly into the format string argument can be abused as a format string vulnerability. An attacker sends a syntactically invalid HTTP request that both triggers the proxy’s error path and includes crafted sequences like%x,%s, and%nin the portion that the device later reflects into the error string. If the vulnerable code executessprintf(errbuf, attacker_input);, the format directives cause reads and writes to stack/heap memory. By carefully placing%nspecifiers, an attacker can overwrite return addresses or function pointers and achieve arbitrary code execution in the security device’s process. This pattern generalizes to any protocol-aware mi...🤖 Agent Actions
Summary:
Tests: Not applicable; documentation-only update.
This PR was automatically created by the HackTricks Feed Bot. Please review the changes carefully before merging.