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Reopen AEAD limits #246
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Or replace the number with a reference to the CFRG draft, assuming they plan to publish it. |
I will follow up with the CFRG authors. |
I have opened an "help wanted" issue in the AEAD-limits repo. |
Given your discussion, I think I'd rather say "the limits for 1.2 are somewhat higher but for consistency, we recommend the same 2^24.5 for both versions." Because if we cite the 2^28 number, people could easily end up using it with TLS 1.3, too. WDYT? |
Sounds like reasonable advice. I don't think there is any existing recommendation about bounds for GCM forgeries in DTLS 1.2 though (i.e., the q =~ 2^28 number). We probably want to add that. |
More detailed analysis in the AEAD limits draft is complicated:
cfrg/draft-irtf-cfrg-aead-limits#40
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