In mozilla/standards-positions#1015 @jakearchibald raises a legitimate concern that developers will attempt to translate HTML fragments with code that amounts to,
element.innerHTML = await translator.translate(element.innerHTML);
This is dangerous because many translation models expect text and not HTML as input. Since HTML is text, treating the output of the translator as HTML risks introducing injection attacks where a maliciously crafted non-HTML input can result in valid HTML output.
While #60 discusses ways in which the API could be extended to officially support translating HTML fragments, the specification should also be amended to document this attack vector as a security consideration.
In mozilla/standards-positions#1015 @jakearchibald raises a legitimate concern that developers will attempt to translate HTML fragments with code that amounts to,
This is dangerous because many translation models expect text and not HTML as input. Since HTML is text, treating the output of the translator as HTML risks introducing injection attacks where a maliciously crafted non-HTML input can result in valid HTML output.
While #60 discusses ways in which the API could be extended to officially support translating HTML fragments, the specification should also be amended to document this attack vector as a security consideration.