Create README.md

Author: roynalnaruto

README.md

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+# Scroll Security Council Tools
+
+The repository offers tools for the Security Council to run and validate certain operations against Scroll's ZkVM [release](https://github.com/scroll-tech/zkvm-prover/releases/tag/v0.2.0)
+
+### Setup
+
+- Clone the `scroll-sc-tools` repository:
+```shell
+$ git clone [email protected]:scroll-tech/scroll-sc-tools.git && cd scroll-sc-tools
+```
+- [Install Rust](https://www.rust-lang.org/tools/install)
+- Install Specific Nightly Toolchain (specified in [rust-toolchain.toml](./rust-toolchain.toml))
+```
+rustup toolchain install nightly-2025-02-14
+```
+
+### Generate Verifier
+
+Scroll's ZkVM architecture proves Scroll's L2 blocks in layers (chunking -> batching -> bundling) where only the final layer (aka bundle) is an EVM-verifiable SNARK proof.
+
+This proof is verified as part of the Bundle Finalization on-chain transaction.
+
+The proof itself is verified by a `Verifier` contract, that's essentially a PLONK-verifier constructed using OpenVM's SDK. The `Verifier` contract is deployed on Sepolia and Mainnet.
+
+The `generate-verifier` command allows one to trustlessly re-generate the verifier contract and prints out its codehash, that can be validated against on-chain available data.
+
+```shell
+$ cargo run -- generate-verifier
+```
+
+### Compute Digests
+
+The final layer (aka bundle) circuit is identified by two digests, namely `digest_1` and `digest_2`.
+
+- `digest_1`: Attestation to the circuit code/logic. Any modification to the circuitry, to any layer including and below the final layer, will trigger a change to this digest value.
+- `digest_2`: Attestation to the circuit config. The `openvm.toml` files configure each circuit (chunk/batch/bundle) and finally this digest value will change if any of those was modified.
+
+An important requirement for "proof generation" to "on-chain verification" is that the on-chain verifier must populate these digests (constants) so as to disallow proof submitter to
+potentially post digests for malicious circuitry. These digests are available on-chain in the deployed contracts on Sepolia and Mainnet.
+
+An independent party can re-compute these digests from the ZkVM released circuitry and validate against on-chain values.
+
+```shell
+# Euclid Phase-1
+$ cargo run -- compute-digest --phase-1
+
+# Euclid Phase-2
+$ cargo run -- compute-digest --phase-2
+```