|
| 1 | +``` |
| 2 | +bLIP: 14 |
| 3 | +Title: Sender authentication |
| 4 | +Status: Draft |
| 5 | +Author: Joost Jager <[email protected]> |
| 6 | +Created: 2022-02-04 |
| 7 | +License: CC0 |
| 8 | +``` |
| 9 | + |
| 10 | +## Abstract |
| 11 | + |
| 12 | +By default, the lightning protocol protects the sender identity by means of |
| 13 | +ephemeral keys and onion routing. There are however use cases that ask for |
| 14 | +inclusion of the sender identity with a payment. |
| 15 | + |
| 16 | +This bLIP serves to document a way to authenticate the sender of a payment via a |
| 17 | +custom TLV record. |
| 18 | + |
| 19 | +## Copyright |
| 20 | + |
| 21 | +This bLIP is licensed under the CC0 license. |
| 22 | + |
| 23 | +## Specification |
| 24 | + |
| 25 | +Sender: |
| 26 | + |
| 27 | +* MUST include a TLV record keyed by type `83231` with the following value: |
| 28 | + |
| 29 | + * [`33*byte`:`sender_pubkey`] |
| 30 | + * [`8*byte`:`timestamp`] |
| 31 | + * [`var length`:`signature`] |
| 32 | + |
| 33 | + `sender_pubkey` is the public key of the sender. Note that `sender_pubkey` doesn't |
| 34 | + need to be the sender's node public key. It can also be a more general |
| 35 | + identity. |
| 36 | + |
| 37 | + `timestamp` is timestamp in nano seconds since unix epoch (big endian encoded). |
| 38 | + |
| 39 | + `signature` is a DER-encoded ECDSA signature calculated using `sender_pubkey` |
| 40 | + over a message that is a concatenation of the following fields: |
| 41 | + |
| 42 | + * `timestamp` (8 bytes) |
| 43 | + * `recipient_pubkey` (33 bytes) |
| 44 | + * `payment_hash` (32 bytes) |
| 45 | + * `payment_secret` (32 bytes) |
| 46 | + * `amount_msat` (8 bytes, big endian) |
| 47 | + |
| 48 | +Receiver: |
| 49 | + |
| 50 | +* MUST verifiy that `signature` is valid and produced using `sender_pubkey`. |
| 51 | + |
| 52 | +* SHOULD verify that `timestamp` is not unreasonably long ago. Suggested cut-off is |
| 53 | + one hour. |
| 54 | + |
| 55 | +* If verification fails, SHOULD error with |
| 56 | + `PERM|15 incorrect_or_unknown_payment_details`. |
| 57 | + |
| 58 | +## Motivation |
| 59 | + |
| 60 | +There are many ways to authenticate the sender of a payment in Lightning. This |
| 61 | +documentation is an attempt prevent the emergence of too many variants that all |
| 62 | +do more or less the same thing. |
| 63 | + |
| 64 | +## Rationale |
| 65 | + |
| 66 | +* The TLV record key is an odd number, meaning that the record is ignored by |
| 67 | + receivers that do not support sender authentication. No feature bit is needed. |
| 68 | + |
| 69 | +* It is possible to recover the public key from an ECDSA signature, so strictly |
| 70 | + speaking `sender_pubkey` is redundant. Note that with Schnorr signatures, recovery is no |
| 71 | + longer possible. |
| 72 | + |
| 73 | +* It is undesired that a signature can be reused in any way. Therefore all of |
| 74 | + the identifying payment properties are covered by the signature. |
| 75 | + |
| 76 | +## Test vectors |
| 77 | + |
| 78 | +TBD |
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