Constitution feedback

[cosmonought]

Thanks for the work on the GnoLand Constitution. I've tried to approach the document from as 'lawlerly' a perspective as I can, putting pressure (perhaps obtusely) on ambiguity, uncertainty, etc, since that is where most disputes arise. What follows is a mix of comments, questions, and suggestions, but two comments up top:

1. Currently Preamble and Article 4 have bold numbered Sections, while Articles 1, 2, and 5 are big blobs, and Article 3 has bolded (but unnumbered) sections. This should be standardized: the more granular sections can be, the better.

2. Although Constitutions have recursive features and references, it would be helpful to order Articles in as ‘up-building’ a method as possible. For example, Article 3 should be Article 1, since the citizens of GnoLand are (presumably) the basis for GovDAO, DAOs and subDAOs, etc.

I'll get through Articles 4 and 5 over the weekend, but wanted to share current feedback here now. I'd be happy to take on some of the work for reorganizing/revising if you need any assistance.

Preamble, Section 1

proponents of each proposal, along with all active governance voters, are required to ensure consistency between such proposals and this Constitution

In principle such a self-regulating system is ideal, but will there be any independent interpretive body/ies (a “court” system) to decide in case of disputes? Article 2 provisions a recursive appeals process up to the “final authority” of GovDAO, but I would recommend considering an independent dispute-resolution body even if it is not initialized until later, for the reasons given in, e.g., Alston, et al,’s work in Institutional and Organizational Analysis, chapter 7.

The current structure has Executive (GovDAO) and Legislative (DAOs and subDAOs) branches. An independent “judiciary” body would help balance them and prevent disputes from devolving into personality clashes and in-fighting.

Amendments are permitted to innovate and adapt this Constitution, but they must respect and adhere to the fundamental principles of this Constitution 

“Fundamental principles” are invoked here but not explicitly identified—I take it that they are broad correlates of transparency, innovation, and decentralization as stated in the preceding (untitled) Preamble section, but two others come up in Section 2: “user agency” and “authentic content.”

Preamble, Section 2

Develop a governance model for contributors by contributors.

Who/what counts as “contributors”? This is the only spot in the Constitution where that term is used. In the preceding section “users” are mentioned, in Article 3, “citizens” (“gnomes”) are identified as a core constituency, and in Article 4, Section 3 there is a “Proof of Contribution” subsection that specifies membership criteria in GovDAO. There may be too many types of participant.

Tangentially: in a recent GnoLand Q&A, it was mentioned that a “for developers by developers” system would deter takeover by financial interests, but one of the lessons I’ve gleaned from the wider ‘Cosmos experience’ is that developers and financial interests are not that easy to disentangle; indeed, most of the ‘bad ideas’ for Cosmos Hub came from developers, not non-developer financial interests. Sometimes the highest clarity about the philosophical mission and values of a project come from those who don’t stand to benefit from particular implementations. This is all just to say that I hope the concept of a “contributor” is broadly construed and accommodates a plurality of skills and interests.

Article 1

Is the GovDAO Charter available somewhere? The article does not mention it, but is GovDAO’s composition supposed to come from the citizenry? Can non-citizens/non-gnomes be on GnoLand’s GovDAO?

Article 2

For facility and ease of reference, I’d recommend chunking this Article into Sections dedicated to its various topics (DAO creation, Council membership, Consensus requirements, subDAO creation, etc) so that future questions or disputes are more easily addressed.

A DAO has a Council composed of zero or more members

It seems odd to say that a DAO’s Council can have zero members. Might it be worth specifying that DAOs with zero members are “dormant” and can only become “active” with three members? I picked three because later in the Article it states: “DAOs may operate with logic on core shards, or, represented as a m-of-n multisig […] where m is more than ½ n and also m is 3 or more.” So it seems a DAO cannot operate with fewer than three members, unless I’ve misunderstood.

A Supermajority in DAO governance is defined to be exactly "two-thirds or more." This is distinct from a Supermajority in Hub Governance.

This section may have been copied from the AtomOne Constitution. Does GnoLand have “Hub Governance”? I believe the reference here should be to GNOTDAO.

Article 3

The Liberty and Property of all citizens of gno.land, hereinafter known as "gnomes", engaging in the gno.land is hereby guaranteed. Any restriction to the Liberty and Property of gnomes on gno.land shall be done only through the GovDAO and requires a Constitutional Majority to pass an amendment to the constitution and optionally a set of laws specifying its enforcement.

The language here is maybe too broad. What constitutes “property” in GnoLand? The tokens, the realms, the smart contracts, etc? If tokens, this Article would seem to forbid slashing for double-signing, etc. If realms/contracts, there may be a question about whose property they are: the creators or the users? Does a developer who creates buggy code that results in users’ property loss create a liability for violating those gnomes’ unrestricted right to property?

Other point: It seems GNOTDAO’s two main functions are: voting on inflation parameter changes, and arbitrating disputes at GovDAO’s discretion. Are there any other chain-wide issues that would fall under GNOTDAO?

[n2p5]

Thank you for your feedback. I'm going to loop up with folks and see how we might address these topics.